We examine empirically how legal origins, creditor and property rights provided by the legal system, and quality of institutions including government, courts, bankruptcy procedure, and accounting systems affect the design of bank loan contracts. Our results support the law and finance view that private contracts reflect differences in legal protection of creditors and properties, as well as the efficiency in the enforcement of contracts and the quality of information. The results also provide evidence for the Coasian view that when transaction costs are low, properly designed private contracts can offset deficiencies in the legal system and/or government. 
I. Introduction
In recent years, a substantial body of empirical evidence has linked laws and institutions to the development of financial and economic systems. Pioneered and developed by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (LLSV hereafter), among other authors, this literature documents that the historical origin of a country's legal system, in particular, countries with English common-law origin vs. French civil-law origin, is strongly correlated with financial and economic "outcomes". For example, countries with English origin (French origin) provide the strongest (weakest) legal protections to both shareholders and creditors (LLSV 1998 (LLSV , 2000a .
Countries with English origin also seem to have better institutions, including less corrupt governments (LLSV 1999), more efficient courts and bankruptcy procedures (Djankov et Despite these connections from legal origin to institutions to financial/economic outcomes, less is known about how these three links connect and relate to each other. In particular, does legal origin, through its shaping of a country's laws and institutions, cause observed differences in outcomes? If so, through what channels? Related to the LLSV results, there is evidence that legal origin does play an important role in explaining differences in financial systems and in economic growth. 1 For example, the English common law system is superior to the French civil law system 1 First, there is the finance and growth literature supporting the view that developing financial system stimulates economic growth (e.g., McKinnon, 1973 , King and Levine 1993, Levine and Zervos 1998). The second strand of literature attempts to establish the link and causality of law, finance, and growth: for example, Levine (1999) provides evidence at country level, Rajan and Zingales (1998) at the industry level, and Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic in its ability to adapt to evolving economic conditions (e.g., Hayek 1960, Posner 1973, Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine 2003b). As a result, firms in French civil law countries face higher obstacles in accessing external finance than those in English common law countries (e.g., Beck et al. 2003c ). 2 There are factors, however, that can alter the financial and economic outcomes as predicted by LLSV papers. Perhaps the most important of these factors flows from the Coasian view that, with low transactions costs, individuals can privately contract and protect each other's rights and interests irrespective of the law. According to this logic, "Coasian bargaining" allows agents to undo the detrimental effects of a weak legal system. If some private contract terms substitute for legal protections, for example, then links between legal institutions and outcomes ought to be partially --or even fully --offset. It is reasonable to believe that an important aspect of the transaction costs in Coasian bargaining is the efficiency of a country's institutions. In this regard,
Acemoglu and Johnson (2003) differentiate laws and institutions governing transactions between
the government/elites and ordinary citizens (property rights institutions) from those governing the transactions among ordinary citizens (contracting institutions). They argue that the first aspect is more important because ordinary citizens within the "same class" can privately contract around deficiencies in laws and institutions through Coasian bargaining, while they probably can not easily avoid government expropriation.
This paper aims to study empirically how laws, institutions, and Coasian bargaining shape private debt contracts by linking price and non-price terms of bank loan contracts to characteristics of borrowers in different countries. To our knowledge there has been very little research on this (1998) find firm-level evidence. Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) show that financial deregulation in U.S. banking was followed by accelerated growth. 2 Other endeavors on understanding institutions include examining the endowment of geography and disease environment in former colonial countries (e.g., Acemoglu et al. 2001 , Beck et al. 2003a , and religion and cultural beliefs (e.g., Greif 1994, Stulz and Williamson 2003).
topic, and our paper aims to start filling this gap. 3 Employing a data set of bank loans from 1994
to 2003 in about 100 countries, we examine how contract features vary across countries in a reduced form setting. We argue that the determinants of bank loan contracts come from two levels: country-level variables incorporating law and institutional factors, and loan-level variables incorporating borrower characteristics. Our focus is on how the country-level factors affect the design of loan contracts. Specifically, we examine the basic pricing term, namely the interest rate, and a set of non-price terms that can provide more protections to lenders beyond the basic price.
These non-price terms include loan maturity, whether or not the loan is secured, whether financial covenants are used, and the ownership structure of the loan at origination.
We have three central results. First, we offer direct evidence that laws and institutions are important in shaping private contracts. Terms of contracts reflect differences in the legal protection of creditors, as well as the efficiency in the enforcement of contracts and the quality of information. For example, when the borrower country provides stronger protection of creditor rights, interest rates are lower, lenders are less likely to secure loans with collateral, and loan maturity is shorter. Moreover, when the borrower country has greater legal formalism leading to courts that are slow to enforce contracts, loans have longer maturity and the ownership of loans is more concentrated.
Second, our results highlight the importance of Coasian bargaining and suggest that properly designed private contracts can mitigate deficiencies in the legal system and/or government. The aforementioned result on creditor rights, for example, supports this view: when the borrower country's creditor rights are poorly protected, lenders can either "price" this risk by 3 Exceptions include Bergman and Nicolaeivsky (2003) , who look at corporate charters before and after IPO in Mexico; Kaplan, Martel and Stromberg (2003) and Lerner and Schoar (2003) , who examine private equity contracts in developed and developing countries; Aggarwal et al. (2003) , who examine the investment allocation choices of actively-managed US mutual funds in emerging economies after the 1997 Asian financial crisis; and Rossi and Volpin (2003), who examine cross country determinants of mergers and acquisitions.
increasing the interest rate, or incorporate other protection measures such as securing the loan with collateral. Borrowers, in turn, seem to "protect" themselves against excessively strong creditors by borrowing on a shorter term basis in countries that give strong control rights to creditors during financial distress. By borrowing short and re-contracting more frequently, borrowers limit the likelihood of losing control to creditors in financial distress.
The strongest prediction of the Coase Theorem -that fully efficient outcomes will be achieved -requires zero transactions costs. While the now well-established links from institutions to outcomes make this prediction clearly too strong, we do find evidence of the importance of transactions costs in shaping contracts. In particular, as a tool to protect lenders, the use of financial covenants crucially depends on the quality of accounting standards. Without good accounting, enforcement of covenants would require excessive monitoring by the lender. We find that when the quality of borrower country's accounting system improves -that is, when transactions costs fall -the use of covenants by lenders becomes more likely, reflecting the importance of transaction costs in determining the bargaining outcome.
Third, our results provide some evidence on the relative importance of property rights institutions vs. contracting institutions (Acemoglu and Johnson 2003) . Among other results, we find that when the government of the borrower country is more corrupt, loans have shorter maturities, presumably because shorter maturity lowers the risk of being expropriated by the government. Arguably, this may be the best solution to government expropriation, as all other measures are subject to the same risk of being repudiated by the government.
Although we do not look directly at financial and economic outcomes, our results do have some policy implications. First, consistent with LLSV, the inverse relationship between creditor rights and interest rates implies that borrowers from countries with poor creditor rights may face a higher cost of capital, and that improving creditor rights may be helpful in attracting more bank and external financing. As a caveat to this implication, however, we do find that loan maturity is lower where creditor rights are strong. Second, improving property right institutions improves financial outcomes by reducing the risks associated with government expropriation. Third, lowering transactions costs (that is, improving accounting) leads to better financial outcomes.
Thus, reforming institutions may be as important as improving the legal rules and codes for emerging countries. 4 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we review related strands of literature on the forces that shape bank loan contracts across different borrower countries, and we describe our key legal and institutional variables. In Section III, we describe our sample of bank loans around the globe, and then present the main empirical results. Section IV concludes the paper. The Appendix contains explanations of all the variables that we use in the paper.
II. Financial Contracts, Legal Protection, and Institutions
In this section we briefly review related strands of literature on law, finance, institutions, and financial contracting between business counterparties. We then use these theoretical arguments to motivate our empirical model.
Our point of departure is the now well-established set of links between legal and institutional variables and financial-system "outcomes" measured at the country level. LLSV (1997, 1998 ) differentiate countries with legal systems derived from those in England, France, Germany and Scandinavia. In addition to these four legal origins, LLSV also characterize another group of countries as having "socialist origin" -the countries that have evolved from socialist, centrally planned economies to market-based economies. LLSV find that countries with English common-law and French civil-law origins are at the extremes. For example, relative to the French legal-origin countries, the English common-law countries have larger financial systems as a share of GDP, they have bigger securities markets, more IPOs, more diffuse ownership of public equity, higher Tobin's Q, and higher dividend payouts that are more closely tied to profits. In addition, the English group of countries offers stronger legal protection of shareholders and creditors, and they have more efficient courts and judicial systems. Not surprisingly, countries with socialist origin are much closer to French-origin countries than to English-origin countries in terms of their legal and financial systems.
Before describing our approach in detail, it is worth briefly describing the "Coasian view" (Coase, 1937 (Coase, , 1960 ) that private parties, absent significant transaction costs, can reach an optimal contract -or move toward an optimal contract -even when certain aspects of the contract are not specified in the law. At first blush, the strong link between a country's laws/institutions and the fitness of its financial system undercuts, to some degree, the Coasian logic. That is, if transactions costs were low enough, all positive NPV investments would be financed -no financial system would have "better" outcomes than any other. The Coasian logic dictates that financial counterparties living in systems with "weak" institutions will find clever ways to offset, or partially offset, the limitation and weakness of those institutions. Applied to the case of bank loan contracts, for example, lenders might seek extra protection beyond what is provided by the legal system in the borrower country through bargaining. The final contract might include protection clauses that are not provided or specified by law upon agreement from both the lender and the borrower, so long as the costs of writing and implementing these clauses are lower than the benefits of the addition of these clauses. Even if the Coase Theorem held exactly, we might still be able to observe differences in the terms of contracts. Thus, our empirical strategy will help illustrate how financial counterparties, using Coasian bargaining, attempt to offset the costs of contracting in a country with weak laws/institutions.
Despite the work of LLSV and others, we still know very little about how, exactly, these legal and institutional variables affect specific aspects of the financial contracts themselves (as opposed to outcomes like the size of equity or debt markets relative to GDP). Our aim is thus to test directly how differences in the contracting environment affect the specific terms of bank loans to large corporate borrowers. The contractual clauses that we examine (as dependent variables)
include whether or not the loan is secured, whether the loan specifically uses financial covenants, the number of lenders (banks), and the two basic items of all loan contracts, namely the interest rate and the maturity. Depending on the transaction costs in including a contract clause and in enforcing it in practice, which can be proxied by the efficiency of a country's institutions, we expect to observe differences in the inclusion and specification of the above contract terms across borrowers and countries.
We consider two sets of explanatory variables that will affect the design of bank loans.
The first set of variables incorporate micro-level aspects of the loan, the borrower, and the lender.
These measures have been employed widely in the bank loan literature and, for our purposes, should be thought of as control variables. For example, larger borrowers and borrowers with highly rated debt pay lower interest rates and are more likely to be able to borrower on an unsecured basis relative to smaller and less well-rated borrowers (Strahan, 1999) . In addition, well capitalized banks seem to supply more credit to their borrowers, thus leading to lower interest rates (Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia, 2002).
The second set of variables describes the country-level factors. These include: (1) variables capturing the basic legal protections (creditor rights, property rights, and the quality of the government); (2) institutional variables (the speed of the judicial system, the efficiency of the bankruptcy regime, and the quality of information collected and distributed to investors through the accounting system); and, (3) legal origin. 5 These country-level differences are the focus of the paper. Taken together, they measure how well a country enforces contracts and protects investors in practice. While creditor and property rights specify the basic legal protections, the efficiency of institutions can be thought of as proxies for the transaction costs in the implementation of these legal protections, in that the actual protection of creditors can be weak in a country despite comprehensive protections provided by law due to the costly implementation process.
In the remainder of this section, we describe the variables and briefly review why each may affect the design of bank loans. It is reasonable to assume that certain aspects of law and institutions will have first-order impact, while others will probably be less important. We examine those aspects of the legal system and a country's institutions that we view as potentially being most important. For other aspects of the law, whose impact we can not measure directly, we include the legal-origin dummy variables, as in LLSV.
II.1 Basic Legal Protections

Creditor Rights
Creditor rights are of paramount importance for lenders in determining their basic legal protections against borrower expropriation. We use a single index to measure a borrower country's overall creditor rights. The index, developed in LLSV's "Law and Finance" (1998) paper, begins at zero and adds one for each of the following conditions that hold: (1) secured creditors gain possession of assets once the petition for reorganization receives approval (no automatic stay); (2) secured creditors are ranked first in the distribution of proceeds; (3) 
Property Rights
While creditor rights specify lenders' ability to control defaulting borrowers, our property rights measure examines more broadly the extent to which the government and law protect private property generally. The property rights measure is an index ranging from 0 to 5, with a higher score indicating better protection of private properties, from the Index of Economic Freedom (IEF), published by the Heritage Foundation. The index measures the degree to which private property rights are protected and accounts for the possibility that such property will be expropriated. In addition, it analyzes the independence of the judiciary, the existence of corruption within the judiciary, and the ability if individuals and businesses to enforce contracts. 6 From the descriptions of creditor and property rights, it is clear that these two measures complement each other and together constitute an overall measure for basic rights of lenders.
Lender risk decreases with better creditor and property rights, controlling for business and financial risk of the borrower and or the borrower's project. Also, for those borrower countries that provide less creditor and property rights protections, lenders have an incentive to protect themselves through the inclusion of covenants in the loan contract, through the use of collateral, and by sharing the risk among multiple lenders.
Quality of Government (Corruption)
To measure government corruption, we follow LLSV (1998, 1999) and use data from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG hereafter). 7 This measure, similar to the property rights measure, is part of ICRG's "political risk" composite index. The variable ranges from 0 to 10, with lower scores indicating that "high government officials are likely to demand special payments and illegal payments are generally expected throughout lower levels of government."
Unlike ICRG's financial and economic indices, which are based on mostly statistical models and data, the corruption index (as well as other political risk measures) is assessed based on ICRG staff's subjective analysis of "qualitative" political information.
Both the property rights and the corruption indices measure the risk of expropriation from the government or powerful elites of a country. In contrast, the other variables in our model, such as the creditor rights index and the institutional variables described below, measure the risk of expropriation from individuals or firms, which are typically the counterparty to the contract. With country-level evidence, Acemoglu and Johnson (2003) argue that expropriation by government and elites hinders financial system development and overall economic growth because individuals cannot contract around this type of risk. 8 In particular, standard tools used to offset credit risk, such as collateral in a bank loan contract, may be less effective in mitigating the risk of 7 The ICRG (of the PRS Group, Inc.) rating for each of the more than 120 countries comprises 22 variables in 3 categories of country risk, political (including corruption), financial, and economic, based on which a composite country risk measure is constructed. Details are available at http://www.icrgonline.com/. 8 In addition, Glaeser et al. (2001) find that the incentives of judges and regulators is an important factor in explaining differences in law enforcement and development of financial systems in Poland and the Czech Republic. Rajan and Zingales (2002, 2003) find evidence from the early 20 th Century to support the interest group theory of financial development where incumbents (including government) oppose financial development because it breeds competition. expropriation from government or elites. In contrast, shortening the maturity of the contract may be a more robust tool to handle such risk. By comparing the impact of government corruption with the impact of the other law and institution variables on bank loan contracts, we can draw inference on the relative importance of these two kinds of risks.
II.2 Efficiency of Legal System and Institutions
Legal Formalism
Legal formalism measures how efficiently the courts of the borrower's country enforce contracts (DLLS 2003). Court efficiency matters for lenders because the enforcement of contracts is perhaps as important as the basic legal protections. Based on extensive surveys of Lex Mundi/Lex Africa association of law firms, DLLS have constructed measures based on how courts handle two types of cases: collection of a bounced check, and eviction of a (non-paying) tenant, with a higher score in either category implying that the court system is slower (with more bureaucracy) and less efficient. 9 These measures are highly positively correlated across countries, and we choose to use the check-based formalism index for our study as the process of collecting a check through a court is more closely related to creditors' desire of collecting their investment back from the borrowers.
With more legal formalism (higher score) in a borrower country, it takes longer for lenders to collect money or assets from a borrower. In anticipation of this, lenders may shorten the length of the loan and "put the borrower on a short leash." Alternatively, with more efficient courts, it becomes easier (and quicker) for lenders to seize control of the firm's assets from the firm's managers when they are allowed to do so. Thus more efficient courts can actually lower borrowers' bargaining power when negotiating with the lenders.
Bankruptcy Procedure
We use the "goals of insolvency" index measuring the success in reaching the three goals of insolvency, available from the World Bank website, and based on surveys of members of the International Bar Association's Committee on Insolvency relating to a hypothetical corporate bankruptcy. 10 As Bankruptcy procedure is an important aspect of institutional efficiency from the lenders' point of view, for at least two reasons. First, the lenders need to know in case of default how much initial investment they can recover and how long this recovery process will take. Second, lenders may also be aware that, in some cases, debtors will default strategically in order to use the bankruptcy system to prevent creditors from seizing their assets, thus maintaining control and perhaps expropriating wealth from creditors. Thus, creditors care about the procedure of actually closing a business in the borrower's country to assess the probability of a bad debtor getting away with voluntary bankruptcy.
Accounting System
Our measure of the quality of a country's accounting system is based on the usefulness of data disclosed to outside investors in audited financial statements. Following LLSV (1998), we adopt an index measure created for 41 countries, based on examining and rating companies' 1990
annual reports on their inclusion or omission of 90 items. One caveat for this index: during early 1990s, accounting standards in many European countries began to converge due to pressure from the European Community. Current accounting standards in some of the European countries may therefore be somewhat different from what were calculated and reported in 1991.
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With a poor accounting system, lenders will have greater difficulty assessing the total risk of the borrower. This in turn leads to a more severe problem of asymmetric information between the borrower and the lenders. One direct impact on the design of loans is that any protection clauses relying on accounting and financial information would be difficult to describe and enforce.
For example, a financial covenant that is very common in the United States limits a borrower's ability to pay dividends if its cash flow or earnings falls below a predetermined level. In a country with weak accounting, this kind of financial covenant would be of limited utility to the lender.
Instead, lenders may rely more on non-financial or non-accounting protection measures, such as securing the loan with "hard" assets (cash or property). Similar to other institutional measures, a poor accounting measure also tends to raise the risk of the lender (e.g., as the problem of asymmetric information worsens), and hence they will tend to shorten the loan and find other lenders, in particular local lenders to reduce the asymmetric information problem and to share the risk.
II.3 Residual Impact of the Legal Origin
As discussed above, there are potentially other aspects of legal protection and institutional efficiency that we do not consider but can affect the design of loans. Since LLSV have demonstrated that almost all of these variables are highly correlated with indicators of legal origin, we include these legal origin indicators to proxy for possible omitted variables. Specifically, if the legal origin dummies are not statistically significant, we know that we have identified all the important variables in the two categories analyzed above in affecting the design of loans.
III. Empirical Methods & Results
III.1 Data
We build a sample of bank loans made to large borrowers located in over 100 countries to test how the legal and institutional variables described above shape an important class of financial contracts, the private debt contract. Loan information comes from the Loan Pricing Corporation's Dealscan database, which provides detailed coverage of bank lending to large corporations. The dataset dates back to the late 1980s, but coverage of lending to companies outside the United
States was quite sparse until the middle of the 1990s. Hence, we begin our sample with loans originated in 1994 and include loans originated through the middle of 2003.
Dealscan allows us to identify which banks are lending to which firms in each year, and to observe in detail various terms of the loans at origination, including the interest rate (measured as a basis point spread over LIBOR, inclusive of all fees), whether or not the loan is secured, the maturity of the loan, the number of lenders involved (many of the loans are syndicated), and whether or not the loan has financial covenants. These contract features serve as the basis for the dependent variables in our models. The two qualitative variables are coded as follows: the secured lending indicator equals one if the loan is secured and zero if it is not; the financial covenants indicator equals one if the loan has these covenants and zero if it does not. For each of these two variables, we estimate a Probit model and report marginal effects (rather than Probit coefficients).
Thus, the reported coefficients represent the change in the probability per unit change in the relevant explanatory variables. (For indicator variables, the coefficient represents the change in the probability associated with moving the indicator from 0 to 1.) The other models are estimated with OLS, where the dependent variable equals the log of the number of lenders, the log of the loan maturity (in months), or the basis point spread of the loan interest rate over LIBOR.
Beyond these loan contract terms, Dealscan also includes information on the type of loan (e.g. lines of credit versus term loans), the purpose of the loan (e.g. debt repayment, commercial paper backup line of credit, general corporate purpose, etc), and the size of the loan. 12 We control in our model for loan type and loan purpose with indicator variables, and we control for loan size by including the log of the commitment amount (in U.S. $s).
For borrower characteristics, Dealscan contains information on Moody's senior debt rating, which we include to control for borrower risk. (We drop loans for which the rating is not available.) Dealscan has only very sparse information on borrower sales, but by including the size of the loan in the models we are able to absorb the bulk of differences based on borrower size.
Given the selection of banks and firms in Dealscan, and our conditioning on the presence of a bond rating, we acknowledge that the results will reflect the effects of cross-country differences in law and institutions on financial contracting between large banks and large borrowers. To some extent focusing on these data limits the generality of our findings, but we think that loans to smaller borrowers are likely to be shaped significantly by a large set of social, cultural and relationship variables that would be difficult or impossible to observe and control across a large number of countries (Petersen and Rajan, 1994). In our view, individual country-level studies, rather than cross-country comparisons, would offer a more fruitful way to understand financial contracting for small firms.
13 Table 1 reports summary statistics on the loan terms by the legal origin of the borrower country. 14 points. In contrast, loan spreads are considerably lower in the Scandinavian countries (60 bps over LIBOR), and considerably higher in the formerly Socialist countries (160 bps). These large pricing differences likely reflect, at least in part, the differences in average borrower risk for these two groups.
Several of the non-price terms seem to vary even more by country group. For example, the share of loans that are secured ranges from a low of 0.03 (in the German countries) to a high of 0.58 (in the Socialist legal-origin countries). The share of loans with financial covenants ranges 13 For example, Allen, Qian, and Qian (2003) show that the private sector in China, despite poor legal protections and inadequate financing through standard channels, has been growing very fast, relying on alternative governance mechanisms and financing channels such as reputation and relationships. 14 Throughout our study the country refers to the location of the borrower, not the lender. In future research we intend to explore how the home country of the borrower interacts with the legal and institutional variables in the borrower's country.
from 0.09 in French legal-origin countries and formerly Socialist countries to 0.17 in the German countries. The average number of participants for these large loans ranges from 9 to 11 banks in the five country groups. Average maturity ranges from 48 to 55 months across the groups.
III.2 Regression Models
In our regression models, we begin by testing for differences in the price and non-price terms of these loans across the five legal-origin groups of countries, controlling only for borrower characteristics (six ratings indicators -AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, and B or worse, and nine onedigit SIC industry indicators) and loan characteristics (loan purpose indicators, log of loan size, and an indicator for lines of credit). In all of our models, the English legal-origin countries serve as the omitted category. We also control for business cycle conditions in the country by adding the growth rate in GDP (in $s) during the year in which the loan was originated. And, we control for the level of development by including the log of per-capita income in the country.
We then introduce variables testing how specific aspects of the contracting environment affect the contract terms themselves. These measures, described in detail above, include the creditor rights index, an index of the "goals of insolvency" achieved by the bankruptcy regime, a measure of the efficiency of the court system (legal formalism), a measure of how well a country's laws and political system protect property rights, a measure of government corruption, and a variable measuring the quality of information disclosed to investors through the accounting system. Table 2 reports mean values for these country-level variables across the five legal-origin groupings. Consistent with the earlier research of LLSV, countries with French or Socialist legal origins tend to have weak protection of creditor & property rights and poorly functioning bankruptcy regimes, their courts tend to be slow-moving due to a high level of legal formalism, and they have relatively weak accounting systems. In addition, government corruption seems higher in these countries relative to the German or Scandinavian legal-origin countries.
Because we can not measure each of the legal/institutional variables for all of our countries (see Table 2 for the number of countries available for each variable), we report a series of specifications including various subsets of the explanatory variables. Each specification will include a somewhat different subset of the data due to missing observations. Such variation in both the set of explanatory variables and the set of observations included offers a convenient robustness test for the findings. Also, because we have many loans for each country (see Table 1 ), but no variation on our key explanatory variables within countries, we cluster the error across all loans made in a single country to account for possible dependence in the error.
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III.3 Results
Tables 3-8 report the regression results. Each of Tables 3-6 focuses on one aspect of the   contract, while Tables 7 and 8 focuses on loan interest rates. For each contract term (in each table) we estimate six specifications. We report the t-statistics under each coefficient, while the p-values are calculated using the robust standard error that assumes that the regression errors are clustered by country. We also report the p-value for an F-statistic testing whether the four legal-origin indicator variables are jointly statistically significant. Table 3 reports results for the secured lending indicator. We find first that collateral is significantly less common in countries with stronger creditor rights. Moving from a country like Mexico, with very weak creditor rights, to one like Germany, with strong rights, would decrease the probability that a loan is secured by about 0.08 (column 2). A standard deviation increase in the creditor rights index would come with a decrease in the probability that a loan is secured of about 0.04. Where creditor rights are strong, collateral seems less necessary to mitigate the risks of lending. Loans are also more likely to be secured in borrower countries with higher per capita GDP (across all columns). In rich countries, where lenders can more easily repossess and sell collateral, secured lending is likely to be an effective tool to reduce control problems. Since holding collateral is costly to the borrower, these results seem to reflect the effects of "Coasian"
Secured Lending
bargaining.
We also find that the risk of government expropriation is at least as important in explaining collateral as creditor rights. In column 1 of Table 3 , we find that secured lending is much more likely in the formerly socialist countries, where corruption is high and protection of property rights is weak ( Table 2 ). The coefficient means that the probability that a loan will be secured by collateral is much higher --0.357 higher --in the formerly socialist countries than in the English legal-origin countries. Once we control for corruption and property rights, however, the coefficient for the socialist-origin countries falls to just 0.059 and becomes insignificant (column 5). Thus, collateral appears much less common where the government and laws better protect property rights. Interestingly, we do not observe any significant difference in the probability that loans are secured between English and French legal-origin countries, despite the fact that Frenchorigin countries score even lower than Socialist-origin countries on the creditor rights scale (1.43 vs. 2.13 in Table 2 ). In what follows we will further discuss the differences in loan contract terms between these two groups of countries.
Loan Maturity
The contractual maturity of banks loans appears to be profoundly shaped by the contracting environment, perhaps more so than any of the other terms that we look at (Table 4) .
One might predict that in "better" contracting environments, bank loans will tend to have longer maturity. Or, conversely, where lenders face big control problems, they will "put the borrower on a short leash." And there is some evidence for this notion. For example, loan maturity is considerably shorter in the French civil-law countries (columns 3, 4, and 5). Also, increased risk of corruption or expropriation of property by governments is associated with shorter term lending.
For example, a standard deviation increase in our corruption measure (increase in the index indicate less corruption) comes with an increase in loan maturity of more than 30 percent.
We find, however, that in countries where creditor rights are stronger and where courts function faster (legal formalism index) that loan maturity is lower. These results run counter to the idea that nervous lenders will use a "short leash," but they may reflect the influence of the concerns of the borrower in the bargaining game that shapes these contracts. Creditors with strong rights in the law have the potential to push borrowers into bankruptcy, where they can effectively take control of the firm. The likelihood that such loss of borrower control over her firm will occur is greater in countries where the law leans heavily in favor of creditors and where courts function efficiently. By shortening the terms of these debt contracts, borrowers may be minimizing this risk. That is, they may prefer to re-contract frequently with creditors, rather than lock into a long term contract that increases the risk of future financial distress and loss of control.
Financial Covenants
We find that financial covenants are more common when the accounting system works more effectively (Table 5 ). This result makes sense because covenants generally key off information in financial statements such as earnings or cash flow. These covenants lose their utility to lenders if reliable measures of financial performance are not available. In contrast, a covenant linked to actions taken by the firm, such as limits on asset sales or additional borrowing,
would not be as reliant on the accounting system. 16 The coefficient suggests that a standard deviation increase in the quality of accounting comes with an increase of about 0.065 in the probability that a loan will have financial covenants. The legal origin variables are jointly, but 16 Unfortunately, we cannot observe these kinds of covenants in Dealscan.
generally not individually, statistically significant. These coefficients suggest that covenants are relatively more common in the German legal-origin countries and relatively less common in the French and Scandinavian countries, compared with English common law countries.
17
Number of Lenders
The concentration of ownership of bank loans seems to be higher -that is, the number of lenders is lower -where laws and institutions help lenders mitigate risk (Table 6 ). From Table 6 , we also find that the number of lenders is significantly lower in the English common-law countries relative to the other four groups. This results stands in contrast to LLSV's finding that ownership of public equity is less concentrated in the English legal origin countries. Table 6 also suggests that the efficiency of a country's court system (legal formalism) is positively related to the number of lenders. (The index in Table 6 increases as court efficiency decreases.)
Where courts work better, ownership of loans tends to be less concentrated. Decreasing the legal formalism index by one standard deviation (increasing efficiency) increases the number of lenders 17 Notice (from Table 2 ) that we do not have information on accounting quality for Socialist-origin countries. As a result, we have to drop the loans from these countries in the regression reported in column 6 of Table 5 .
by 11 to 17 percent. Lenders seem more willing to share risks if they believe that disputes can be settled relatively efficiently in the courts. Private re-negotiation of contracts is more likely to be optimal in countries with inefficient legal procedures, which is easier with fewer lenders (fewer conflicts or interest, hold-up problems, etc).
Since legal formalism is worst in French origin countries, combining our result here with the result on the coefficient on legal origin above, we can conclude that loans made to French origin countries have more dispersed ownership (more lenders) as compared to English origin countries. As LLSV show, in English origin countries the external markets, in particular the stock markets, are broad and efficient; and because the law protects outside shareholders better, the equity ownership is more dispersed. Compared to the English origin countries, the role of stock markets and equity financing is not as important for firms (relative to debt markets) from countries with other legal origins. One can argue that in these countries the role of financial intermediaries as monitors for firms becomes more important, as opposed to the generally passive role of minority shareholders who are not well protected in general. Our results suggest that lenders in these countries, facing the risk from poor creditor rights, share loans with a larger number of other lenders. This less concentrated ownership presumably reduces the effectiveness of lender monitoring. Thus, along with the LLSV results on equity ownership and protection of small shareholders, our results may help explain differences in firm valuations across legal regimes.
Loan Interest Rate
In our last set of results, we test how the pricing of loans reflects the country-level legal and institutional variables (Tables 7 and 8 ). In Table 7 , we examine the determinants of loan interest rates (relative to bank's cost of funds as measured by LIBOR) in the same reduced form setting used for the other loan contract terms. We then add the other, arguably endogenous, loan terms (secured by collateral, financial covenants, loan maturity, the number of lenders) to the regressions as a robustness test (Table 8 ).
The main results on the determinants of loan interest rates are robust to both regression models specified in Tables 7 and 8 . First, loan interest rates are lower in countries with strong creditor rights and good protection of property rights. The coefficients are very large, both economically and statistically. For example, moving again from Mexico to Germany would come with a decline in the interest mark-up over LIBOR of 30 to 40 percent (Table 7) . Improving property rights protection by one standard deviation would come with a drop of 10 to 20 percent in the interest rate (Table 7) . 18 Government corruption also enters negatively -greater corruption correlates with higher rates -but the effects are not statistically significant in either table. The effects of the bankruptcy regime or the quality of the accounting system, however, are not statistically significant.
Second, the coefficients on the legal origin variables suggest, surprisingly, that interest rates are lower in the French and Scandinavian countries relative to the English and German legalorigin countries. The coefficients in Table 7 , for example, indicate that loan-rate markups (relative to LIBOR) are about 18 to 46 percent lower in the French legal-origin countries than in the English countries (columns 1 through 5). The difference in loan interest rates between the French legal-origin and English-origin countries is particularly interesting in light of the empirical work cited above suggesting that, across a variety of dimensions, the English civil-law countries have better functioning financial markets. On its face, the higher loan interest rates would seem to suggest a higher, rather than lower, cost of capital (or at least debt capital) in the English countries.
If financial markets there are better, shouldn't the cost of capital be lower rather than higher? One 18 From Table 8 , the impact of creditor rights (property rights) is smaller (larger) on interest rates than that from Table  7 , while the coefficients remain statistically significant. possible explanation for this result is the prevalence in French-origin countries of subsidized lending to politically connected borrowers by government-owned banks (LLS 2002). Such subsidies lower stated borrowing costs but likely lead to significant inefficiency and misallocation of capital, thus hurting capital markets rather than helping them. In future work, we plan to explore this idea more fully.
III.4 Discussion
At the risk of reductionism, we can boil down many of our results along the lines of suggested by Acemoglu and Johnson (2003) , who argue that differences in financial and economic system outcomes across the world reflect differences in contracting institutions and property rights institutions. In their taxonomy, contracting institutions pertain to ways in which a country allows private parties to write and enforce contracts among themselves; property rights institutions pertain to protection of individuals and firms against the possibility of expropriation of wealth or abrogation of contracts by the government or elites.
The key contracting institutions for bank loans seem to be the level of creditor rights, legal formalism, and the quality of the accounting system. There seems to be a very limited role for our measure of the quality of a country's bankruptcy regime in shaping features of the loans in our sample. We find that creditor rights affect the likelihood that loans are secured, loan maturity, and the interest rate on loans. Where creditors are strong relative to debtors, loans are less likely to be secured and have lower interest rates, but they tend to have relatively short maturity. For legal formalism, we find that where courts operate slowly loans tend to be more concentrated and have longer maturity. Notice that for these two kinds of institutions, the results suggest a tradeoff, rather than a clear implication that one kind of institution dominates the other. For example, giving strong control to the lender in distress leads to lower interest costs, but seems to make borrowers less willing to write long-term debt contracts. Similarly, the expectation of very fast dispute resolution in the courts presumably lowers to cost of resolving disputes, but it also seem to reduce loan maturity, perhaps because efficient judicial systems tempt lenders to push borrowers into financial distress too often. Shortening the loan maturity may offset this risk for the borrower.
The results related to the accounting regime, however, do not suggest any tradeoffs. Better accounting seems associated with better contracts, and this finding seems quite consistent with
Coase's prediction that low transaction costs (good accounting) ought to lead private parties toward efficient outcomes. We find that where the accounting regime produces better information for investors, financial covenants are more common, loan concentration is higher (suggesting better monitoring), and loan maturity is longer. While the effect of accounting on loan maturity is only marginally statistically significant (at the 10.1 percent level), the coefficient magnitude is large economically. For example, moving from the typical English-law country, where the accounting regime scores 69.5 out of 100, to the typical French-law country (accounting score = 51.2) would increase loan maturity by about 17 percent.
Our results also suggest that weak property rights institutions are harmful for financial contractors. In countries with weak protection of property rights or high levels of government corruption, secured lending is more common, concentration of lending is lower, loan maturity is shorter, and prices are higher. All of these would seem to lead to higher costs of capital. Holding collateral is costly to the borrower; lower loan concentration reduces monitoring incentives for lenders; short-term borrowing requires more frequent re-contracting and raises uncertainty; and, of course, higher interest rates directly raise borrowing costs.
So, contracting institutions -such as the protection of creditor rights or legal formalismseem to involve tradeoffs reflecting the bargaining that goes on between borrowers and lenders. In contrast, the results regarding property rights regimes do not. Bank loan contracts simply look more efficient in countries with better protection of ordinary citizens against elites. In this sense, the results are consistent with Acemoglu and Johnson (2003) , who show that financial-system outcomes are much more strongly tied to property rights institutions than they are with contracting institutions. The findings suggest that Coasian bargaining allows private parties to at least partially offset the effects of contracting institutions, but such bargaining can do little to protect them from the government.
IV. Conclusion
In this paper we examine how legal origin, creditor and property rights provided by the legal system, and quality of institutions including government, courts, bankruptcy procedure, and accounting system of the borrower's country affect the design of bank loan contracts around the world. Our results support the law and finance view that private contracts reflect differences in legal protection of creditors and properties, as well as the efficiency in the enforcement of contracts and quality of information. We also find evidence that Coasian effects are important, particularly where transaction costs are low, in allowing properly designed private contracts to solve (or soften) deficiencies in the legal system. These results imply that improving institutions may be as important as developing the legal codes for an emerging economy in order to attract more investment capital.
Based on our results, banks face two broad types of "risks": the business risk of a project, and the risk of expropriation by insiders and/or the government. Creditors protect themselves against these risks with what might be characterized as "price" protections (interest rate mark-ups and loan maturity) and "non-price" protections (collateral, covenants, diversification).
Enforcement of non-pricing terms, such as collection of collateral or calling a loan when a covenant has been breached, depends on the specific laws and institutions of the country. In some legal arrangements such as Chapter 11 of the U.S. bankruptcy law, for example, debtor firms can sometimes prevent, or at least slow, secured lenders' ability to take control of the collateral. In other countries, such as the U.K., creditor rights in the law are much stronger, thus lowering the cost of foreclosing on collateral when firms default. In contrast, price protections (interest rate and maturity) would seem to be equally useful under any legal or institutional arrangement. Thus, there is a potential role for changes in the legal environment to change the way in which these two broad sorts of contracting tools are used.
In future research, we plan to model the interaction between a country's legal system and the choice or intensity with which risks are mitigated with the use of "price" and "non-price"
protections. The empirical work thus far should be characterized as reduced form modeling in which we explain endogenous contract terms as functions of exogenous variables reflecting the contracting environment (e.g. legal and institutional variables). To get beyond reduced form modeling -that is, to understand the interaction between contract terms and to test how those interactions are affected by the legal and institutional arrangements -we hope to model theoretically how legal, institutional, financial, work together to determine these financial contracts. 
Creditor rights Index
An index aggregating different creditor rights. The index is formed by adding "1" when: (1) the country imposes restrictions, such as creditors' consent or minimum dividends to file for reorganization; (2) secured creditors are able to gain possession of their security once the reorganization petition has been approved (no automatic stay); (3) secured creditors are ranked first in the distribution of the proceeds that result from the disposition of the assets of a bankrupt firm; and (4) the debtor does not retain the administration of its property pending the resolution of the reorganization. The index ranges from zero to four.
Bankruptcy and reorganization laws; LLSV (1998)
Legal reserve requirement
The minimum percentage of total share capital mandated by corporate law to avoid the dissolution of an existing firm. It takes a value of zero for countries without such a restriction Company law or commercial code; LLSV (1998) Property Rights Index Variables includes freedom from government influence over the judicial system, commercial code defining contracts, sanctioning of foreign arbitration of contract disputes, government expropriation of property, corruption within the judiciary, delays in receiving judicial decisions, and legally granted and protected private property.
Index of Economic Freedom (Heritage Foundation)
Secondary source: LLSV (1997, 1998) 
A.2. Institutions Variables
Variables
Definition
Original Source
Check-based Legal Formalism
The Index measures substantive and procedural statutory intervention in judicial cases at lower-level civil trial courts, and is formed by adding up these indices: 1) professionals vs. laymen; 2) written vs. oral elements; 3) legal justification; 4) statutory regulation of evidence; 5) control of superior review; 6) engagement formalities; 7) independent procedural actions.
Survey of Lex Mundi/Lex Africa association of law firms; DLLS (2003), and details available at http://iicg.som.yale.edu/
Goals of Insolvency
It is calculated as the simple average of the cost of insolvency (rescaled from 0 to 100, where higher scores indicate less cost), time of insolvency (rescaled from 0 to 100, where higher scores indicate less time), the observance of absolute priority of claims, and the efficient outcome achieved. The total Goals-of-Insolvency Index ranges from 0 to 100, with a higher score indicating higher efficiency. ***: significant at 1%, **: significant at 5%, *: significant at 10% at levels.
Table 4 Determinants of Loan Maturity
The dependent variable is log of contractual maturity in months. Estimation technique is OLS. Regressions also contain ratings indicators, industry indicators, and loan purpose indicators ("lines of credit" are dropped). Only rated loans/borrowers are included in the regressions. Loan observations are clustered by borrower country. T-stats are in the parenthesis below the coefficient, and p-values are calculated using robust standard errors. ***: significant at 1%, **: significant at 5%, *: significant at 10% at levels. ***: significant at 1%, **: significant at 5%, *: significant at 10% at levels.
Table 7 Determinants of Loan Interest Rates
The dependent variable is log of drawn all-in-spread (interest rate mark-up). Estimation technique is OLS. Regressions also contain ratings indicators, industry indicators, and loan purpose indicators. Only rated loans/borrowers are included in the regressions. Loan observations are clustered by borrower country. Tstats are in the parenthesis below the coefficient, and p-values are calculated using robust standard errors.
(1) ***: significant at 1%, **: significant at 5%, *: significant at 10% at levels.
Table 8 Determinants of Loan Interest Rates With other Loan Contract Terms as Explanatory Variables
The dependent variable is log of drawn all-in-spread. Estimation technique is OLS. Regressions also contain ratings indicators, industry indicators, and loan purpose indicators. In addition (and different from Table 7 ), other loan terms (secured, covenants, maturity and number of lenders) are also included. Only rated loans/borrowers are included in the regressions. Loan observations are clustered by borrower country. T-stats are in the parenthesis below the coefficient, and p-values are calculated using robust standard errors.
(1) 
